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Abstract: 
Using the state level data from India, this paper investigates the size 
of the hidden economy in Indian states over the period 1974/75 to 1995/96. 
Our analysis has shown that after liberalization of the Indian economy in 
1991/92, the growth in the size of the hidden economy has decreased on an 
average. Our results show that the growth in the size of the hidden economy 
is approximately 4% less in scheduled election years than in all other years. 
We also demonstrate that the growth is significantly lower in those states 
where the coalition government is in power. An increased growth of 
newspapers and the literacy rates translate to cleaner governance, e.g. to 
fewer amounts of shadow economy activities in the economy. 
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1. Introduction 
Economists and social scientists have shown considerable interest 
in recent years to measure the gap between the observable and the 
actual. This has led to the conceptualization of the ‘hidden economy’, 
although several synonyms such as black, shadow, underground, 
unobserved, unofficial, unrecorded, and parallel were used for the 
‘hidden economy’. In general, it tries to capture the activities beyond 
measurement by official activity.2 The hidden economy consists of 
legal and illegal activities outside the reach of the government.3 
Empirical estimates demonstrate that underground activities have 
been on the rise since the 1970s when the presence of government 
activity became stronger in the economies around the world. With 
increase in tax rates to finance larger public spending programs, the 
desire to escape taxes and regulatory restrictions also gained in 
prominence (Tanzi and Schuknecht, 1997). Popular print-media 
articles were also ready to accept the notion that the underground 
economy had increased significantly over the years. Given such media 
attention, the nexus of the black economy into the public glare has 
created a consciousness about the gravity of the phenomenon all over 
the world. 
Given the importance of the phenomenon, the next question that 
naturally arises is regarding the definition of the hidden economy. 
Tanzi (1999) suggests that the shadow economy crops up because of 
presence of activities that are difficult to measure and tax, like 
household work and also criminal and illegal activities. Schneider 
(1986) sums this point by defining the underground economy as “all 
economic activities that contribute to the value added and should be 
included in national income in terms of national accounting 
conventions but are presently not registered by national measurement 
agencies”. Bhattacharyya (1999) describes the hidden economy as 
reflected by the unrecorded national income “calculated as the 
difference between the potential national income for the given 
currency in circulation and the recorded national income”. Bagachwa 
and Naho (1995) consider it as a combination of informal (small-scale 
production and distribution units), parallel (illegal production of legal 
activities) and black market activities (production and distribution of 
market and non-market goods forbidden by the government). Acharya 
(1985), in the Indian context, refers to the black economy as “the 
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aggregate of incomes which are taxable but are not reported to the tax 
authorities” and also “the extent to which estimates of national income 
and output are biased downwards because of deliberate, false 
reporting of incomes, output and transactions for reasons of tax 
evasion, flouting of other economic controls and related motives”. A 
commonly used working definition is: all currently unregistered 
economic activities, which contribute to the officially calculated (or 
observed) Gross National Product.4 Smith (1985, p. 18) defines it as 
“market-based production of goods and services whether legal or 
illegal that escapes detection in the official estimates of GDP”. 
The above discussion suggests that the shadow or hidden economy 
deals with the portion of the income earned from legal and illegal 
activities that cannot be accounted for by the standard measurement 
procedures used in compilation of national income accounts. We, in 
this paper, adopt this as a relatively broad definition of the 
‘underground economy’. 
In this paper, we try to estimate the size of the hidden (shadow) 
economy for fourteen major states of India over the period 1974/75 to 
1995/96 using a multiple indicator multiple cause (MIMIC) model. 
Given the estimates of the size of the shadow economy, we also offer 
an empirical investigation to determine the role of socioeconomic, 
political and institutional factors explaining the size of the hidden 
economy. Our approach thus demonstrates the importance of policy 
actions in increasing government responsiveness to curb the size of 
the hidden economy. We particularly emphasize on the role of election, 
nature of the governments, literacy, mass media, and the impact of 
liberalization in this context. Kaufman (1999) considers knowledge and 
information; leadership and collective action can be used as the prime 
weapons to tackle corruption. Stapenhurst (2000) provides a brief link 
between an active media and the amelioration of corruption as also the 
shadow activities of the economy. Djankov et al. (2002) demonstrate 
that the government ownership of the media is generally associated 
with less press freedom, fewer political and economic rights, and, most 
importantly, inferior social outcomes in the areas of education and 
health. Ahrend (2002) provides strong empirical evidence that 
suggests that strengthening press freedom should be among the 
priorities fighting against corruption. Dyck and Zingales (2002) discuss 
the role of the media influencing corporate policy. 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 80, No. 2 (2006): pg. 428-443. DOI. This article is © Elsevier and permission has 
been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Elsevier does not grant permission for this article 
to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Elsevier. 
4 
 
India provides an interesting framework. India has been a 
democracy since 1947. Periodic elections to the national and state 
legislative assemblies have taken place since 1952. There is a 
relatively free and independent press with significant time-series and 
cross-sectional Variation. Using these data, we are able to examine a 
connection between the development of mass media, political and 
institutional factors and government actions to cater the needs of the 
citizens. In this connection, our paper can be viewed in line with the 
growing literature that uses data from India to examine the role of 
institutional and political factors to explain government 
responsiveness. Besley and Burgess (2000) demonstrate that party 
ideology affects public policy: the cumulative land reforms passed in a 
given state-year depend on the 4-year lagged state legislative 
assembly seat shares of different political groups. Besley and Burgess 
(2002) show that state governments are more responsive to falls in 
food production and crop damage in those states where newspaper 
circulation is higher and electoral accountability is greater. Banerjee 
and Iyer (2004) document that differences in historical institutions 
lead to very different policy choices, and hence to, differences in 
economic outcomes. Iyer (2004) demonstrates that areas under direct 
British rule have significantly lower levels of public goods in the 
present period. Hoff (2003) provides a survey relating institutional 
developments and its impact on economic growth. However, none of 
the above-mentioned papers has addressed the issue of the size of the 
unofficial economy in the Indian state context. Our paper is an attempt 
in this direction. 
The Wanchoo Committee Report (Government of India, Ministry of 
Finance, 1971, p. 6) was the first to draw attention on the shadow 
economy in India. They referred to the phenomenon as a “cancerous 
growth in the country's economy which if not checked in time, will 
surely lead to its ruination”. The Venkatappiah Committee Report 
(Government of India, 1974), which focused on the self-removal of 
excise taxes also felt “free to confess that we are not prepared for, and 
are, therefore, painfully surprised at, the range, diversity and, in 
certain segments of production, almost the universality of the evasion, 
which is practiced by those who produce the goods”. Besides taxes, 
the extent of regulation present in the economy in the form of 
industrial licensing, import licensing, controls on prices and distribution 
channels of goods and services, credit controls and other measures 
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can encourage the proliferation of the hidden economy. The Dagli 
Committee Report (1979) highlighted this phenomenon. 
The remaining parts of the paper are organized in the following 
manner. The next section presents a brief review of the literature for 
estimation of the size of the hidden economy. Section 3 discusses the 
estimation methodology. Section 4 is divided in to three subsections: 
the first subsection lists out the basic data variables used in the 
analysis, the second one document the nature of the hidden economy 
estimates obtained by the used methodology, and the last deals with 
the role of political and institutional factors explaining the size of the 
hidden economy. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Methods of measuring the hidden economy 
Our study is different from the earlier underground economy 
studies conducted in the Indian context by Gupta and Mehta (1981), 
Chopra (1982), Acharya (1985), Bhattacharyya (1999), and 
Bhattacharyya and Ghose (1998) in the following way: 
1) While Acharya (1985), Bhattacharyya (1999), and Bhattacharyya 
and Ghose (1998) used traditional cash demand estimation 
methodology, which has been criticized in the literature for its 
focus on just one facet of the hidden economy, this work uses the 
MIMIC model. Gupta and Mehta (1981) have used a physical input 
approach where as Chopra's method is in close line with the one 
suggested by Kaldor (1956).5 
2) The uniqueness of the study hinges on the fact that it addresses 
the crucial question: Does an increase in the presence of civic 
institutions like media have a contractionary effect on the size of 
the hidden economy of a democracy like India? 
In this paper, we attempt to estimate the hidden economy by 
multiple indicator multiple cause approach (MIMIC). Frey and Week-
Hannemann (1984) were the first to employ this methodology for the 
estimation of the hidden economy of a cross-section of 17 OECD 
countries for the period of 1960-78. They borrowed from the statistical 
theory of unobserved variables developed by the likes of Zellner 
(1970), Goldberger (1972) and Joreskog and Goldberger (1975) which 
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considers multiple causes and multiple indicators of the phenomenon 
to be measured and used a factor-analytic approach to measure the 
hidden economy as an unobserved variable over time. The unknown 
coefficients are estimated separately through a set of structural 
equations with the indicator variables being used to capture the effect 
of the unobserved variables indirectly. Frey and Week-Hannemann 
(1984) provided a ranking of OECD countries based on the size of their 
underground economies. In the late 1970s, Scandinavian and Benelux 
countries were seen to have very large hidden economies followed by 
US in the middle rank and then by Switzerland and Japan, which 
exhibit very small sizes of underground activity for that period. Also 
growth rates wise, Denmark, Belgium, and Italy’s hidden segment 
seem to have grown at an above average pace while Canada, UK and 
USA’s hidden economy was found to be below the average rate. 
Another study by Aigner et al. (1988) uses a variant of the MIMIC 
approach − the DYMIMIC (the dynamic multiple-indicators multiple-
causes approach) to assess the size of the US hidden economy for the 
period 1939-1982. The results of this study have found a peak in the 
US hidden economy size around 1943-44 and a trough in 1967-68. 
In recent years, a lot of work has been done using the unobserved 
or latent variable approach, particularly in the context of New Zealand 
and Canada. Giles (1999a,b), Giles and Caragata (2001), and Giles 
and Tedds (2002) have used the time series data for the New Zealand 
and the Canadian economy, to arrive at hidden economy estimates, 
using the MIMIC approach. To the best of our knowledge, this is the 
first attempt to estimate the size of the hidden economy using MIMIC 
model in the Indian context. 
3. Estimation methodology 
This section describes in brief the MIMIC variable approach. The 
MIMIC model actually is a variant of the LISREL (linear independent 
structural relationships) models of Joreskog and Sorbom (1993a,b) 
and others that can only yield a time-series index for the latent 
variables: an ordinal index. We need to convert ordinal index into a 
cardinal series of values of hidden economy sizes by scaling up the 
ordinal values to some cardinal value that has been obtained in the 
past through other methods of estimation like the electricity or the 
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currency demand approach. The MIMIC model equations can be stated 
as: 
y = λη + ε                                                                             (1) 
η = γ'x + ζ                                                                             (2) 
where y is a column vector of ‘p’ indicators of the latent variable, η, 
and x is a column vector of the ‘q’ “causes” of η. In other words, Eq. 
(1) is the measurement model for η and Eq. (2) is the structural 
equation for the latent variable, η. ε is a (px1) measurement error 
while ζ is the scalar structural error. It is assumed that ζ and all the 
elements of ε are mutually uncorrelated, with var(ζ) = ψ , and cov(ε) 
= θε . Substituting (2) into (1), the MIMIC model can be expressed as 
a p-equation multivariate regression model: 
y = Πx + z                                                                             (3) 
where Π = λγ′, z = λζ + ε, and cov(z) = λλ′ψ + θε. 
 The p-equation model in (3) seems to have a regression matrix 
of rank equal to one and an error covariance matrix that is similarly 
constrained. The first condition is typical in simultaneous equation 
models where the removal of a few exogenous variables from the 
structural equation might cause a part of the reduced form coefficient 
matrix to be short-ranked. The singularity property of the error 
covariance matrix develops because for the measurement model to be 
estimated it has to be normalized first. This implies that the estimation 
of (1) and (2) can be carried only after (1) is normalized by setting 
one element of λ to a pre-assigned value. We estimate the model 
using the Maximum Likelihood Estimation procedure. 
We use the following combinations of the causes and indicators 
to arrive at different hidden economy estimates. For the indicators, we 
use the growth in real net state domestic product of the Indian states 
(Grsdp)6 and the total number of employees (sum of productive and 
non-productive workers) in registered manufacturing industries 
adjusted by the total number of factories in a state (Temp). For the 
causal variables, we have included the following: capital account 
developmental expenditure (Capdev), capital account non-
developmental expenditure (Cqndev), states’ own tax revenue (Otr), 
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states’ own non-tax revenue (Ontr), states’ current account 
developmental expenditure (Curdev), and states’ current account non-
developmental expenditure (Curndev). All the expenditures and tax 
variables are expressed as a proportion of states’ net domestic 
product. 
The total revenue of a state government consists of two 
components: total tax revenue, and total non-tax revenue. A state 
government’s total tax revenue is, in turn, decomposed into two parts: 
its share in the tax revenue of the central government and revenue 
raised through state taxes. State taxes are mainly indirect in natures.7 
A state government’s non-tax revenue derives from two sources: 
grants from the central government, and own non-tax revenue. The 
interest receipts from loans issued by the state government, dividends 
and profits from public sector undertakings owned by the state 
government, and revenues from state lotteries are the major 
constituents of the non-tax revenue. In this paper, we use the own tax 
revenue and own non-tax revenue components of total revenue. The 
total expenditures incurred by state governments are on either the 
current account or the capital account. Current account expenditure is 
of three types: developmental spending, non-developmental spending 
and grants to local governments. Developmental current account 
spending mainly meets the need to maintain the existing assets mainly 
in terms of economic services (inclusive of expenditure on agriculture, 
industry, power and irrigation, transport and communications) and 
social services (inclusive of education, health and family welfare, 
planned expenditure on social security), where as non-developmental 
part consists of interest payments on past debts, expenditure on fiscal 
and administrative services, pension and retirement benefits, non-
planned expenditure on social security and welfare and food subsidy. 
Capital account expenditure consists of two parts: development and 
non-developmental where the former mainly concentrates on creation 
of physical assets. Non-developmental part of the capital expenditure 
is mainly used for repayments for loans to central governments and 
discharge of internal debt. 
As stated earlier, the MIMIC model can only yield a time-series 
index for the latent variables (the underground economy). However, it 
can only give an index for a time-series. Therefore, we need to convert 
this ordinal index into a cardinal series of values of hidden economy 
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sizes by scaling up the ordinal values to some cardinal value obtained 
in the past through other methods of estimation like the electricity or 
the currency demand approach and using values from it to calibrate 
the ordinal series obtained by the MIMIC approach. Here we have 
adopted this option. We have used Bhattacharyya's (1999) hidden 
economy estimate for India, of 22.5% for 1989-90, to scale up our 
ordinal hidden economy series to arrive at the complete cardinal 
underground economy sizes for different states for India. 
Given the above estimates, in the next stage, we have tried to 
explain whether the civic institutions like media, political institutions or 
characteristics of the state governments affect the growth in the size 
of the hidden economy estimates (git). The regression equation for this 
model takes the standard panel data form: 
git = αi + λi + ρlog(Hit−1) + μti + βeit + δfit + ηsit + Øwit + ϕpit + ψlitit + 
μprimaryit + θrurit + uit                                                              (5) 
where αi is a state fixed effect and  λt is a time-dummy 
controlling for aggregate shock. The term, Hit−1 is the lagged size of 
the hidden economy. We have allowed for the state-specific trend (ti)    
in our estimation. The variable fit variable represents the government 
characteristics in terms of coalition measuring the proportion of year ‘t’ 
where a coalition government is in power with more than one pivotal 
party. We call this variable as Coalition government. The variable eit 
represents an election year dummy taking the value of one if a 
scheduled election is held in the second half of financial year t or in the 
first half of the next financial year in state i. We have also included two 
other variables (sit and wit) in the above equation. The first one 
captures the extent of political affiliation between the governments at 
the center and the state. Specifically, this is a dummy variable that 
takes the value of 1(0) if the government in state s is politically 
affiliated with the central government for more (less) than 6 months 
during financial year t. The second one tries to capture the difference 
between a left-wing state government (that is, a government headed 
by a communist party) and all other government types. The variable 
wit measures the proportion of financial year t during which the 
government of state i was a left-wing government. We have also 
introduced two other variables in Eq. (5): namely the proportion of 
rural population (Rur), and contribution of primary sector (primary) 
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(agriculture and allied services) in total net state domestic product. 
The variable denoted by pit refers to the growth in per capita total 
newspaper circulation while lit refers to the growth in literacy rates. 
In Eq. (5), the error term uit is modeled as an AR(1) process 
where we allow state-specific degree of autocorrelation. Estimation of 
Eq. (5) via generalized least squares also permits us for a 
heteroskedastic error structure with each state having its own 
variance.8 
4. Empirical results 
4.1. Data 
The data set for our study consists of annual observations from 
1974-75 to 1995-96 covering the 14 major states of India. The 
fourteen major Indian states are: Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Gujarat, 
Haryana, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, 
Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal. The 
variables that we consider partition into two major categories: (1) data 
on the indicator variables (Grsdp and Temp) and (2) data on cause 
variables. The real net state domestic product is obtained from various 
issues of the National Accounts Statistics (Government of India, 
Ministry of Planning, Department of Statistics), published by the 
Central Statistical Organization of the Government of India. The 
employment data for the registered manufacturing industries were 
complied from various issues of the Annual Survey of Indian 
Industries, Ministry of Statistics and Program Implementation, 
Government of India. The data on cause variables such as tax and 
expenditure variables of state governments were collected from 
various volumes of the Reserve Bank of India Bulletin, published by 
the Central bank of India. 
State demographic characteristic like the contribution of the 
primary sector is constructed using the National Accounts Statistics. 
The literacy rates are collected from Census of India and the National 
Sample Survey rounds (both published by the Government of India). 
For some years, state literacy rate data were not available from either 
the Census of India or the National Sample Survey rounds. For these 
years, we have interpolated the data using a simple growth rate 
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formula. We obtain the per capita newspaper circulation figures from 
Press in India (published by the Ministry of Information and 
Broadcasting). We have also experiment with total vernacular 
language newspaper circulation, total English newspaper circulation, 
total second language newspaper circulation and total other language 
newspaper circulation. All these come from Press in India. Our data on 
political variables comes from multiple sources. First, the dates of all 
state legislative assembly elections were taken from the book India 
Decides (Butler et al., 1996) and from the official website of Election 
Commission of India.9 Thereafter, for each state-year combination, the 
“nature” of the state government (coalition, political. affiliation and 
ideology was determined. We have collected this information from the 
publication Encyclopedia of India and Her States (Grover and Arora, 
1998). 
4.2. Results 
This section is divided in two parts: Section 4.2.1 reports the 
results for the MIMIC model where as the results from the estimation 
of Eq. (5) is reported in Section 4.2.2. 
4.2.1. The MIMIC model’s estimates of the hidden economy of 
Indian states 
In this sub-section, we present the hidden economy estimates 
of the Indian states. We have estimated the MIMIC model separately 
for individual states.10 For an illustrative purpose, however in Table 1 
we present the results for four states, namely, Andhra Pradesh, 
Kerala, Maharashtra and West Bengal. Our results clearly indicate the 
following: although the causal variables enter in general with expected 
signs, however, many of them lack individual significance. Table 2 
reports the diagnostic statistics for the estimated model. Small values 
of root mean square residual (RMR) where as large values of the 
adjusted goodness of fit index (AGFI), and the parsimony goodness of 
fit index (PGFI), reflect a good model fit. In almost all the models, the 
diagnostic statistics give a satisfactory result in terms of model fit. In 
Table 3, we present the results for the size of the underground 
economy of Indian states for four samples: 1974/75-1980/81, 
1981/82-1985/86, 1986/87-1991/92 and 1992/93-1995/96. Table 3 
depicts some interesting pictures: for the entire period, state of 
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Haryana has the lowest size of underground economy followed closely 
by the southern state of Tamil Nadu while that of Bihar is the highest. 
The southern states namely, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala and 
Tamil Nadu represent lower underground economy in comparison with 
other states of India. Three of five BIMARU11 states have an average 
size of under-ground economy that is larger than that of all-14 
average. States like Haryana, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh 
and West Bengal show a considerable size of the hidden economy in 
the post-liberalization era (1992/93-1995/96) compared to the entire 
period. 
In Fig. 1, we also provide a diagrammatic exposition of the 
average size of the hidden economy for fourteen major states along 
with that of all-India.12 In this figure, the column all-14 represents a 
simple average for the fourteen major states. For the sample period, 
the hidden economy for all-India stands at 20.35% of GDP. The size of 
the hidden economy has increased from 15.39% (1974/75) to 23-21% 
(1995/96). States as Bihar, Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, 
Punjab, and Rajasthan had experienced a higher size on an average 
compared to all-India figure. 
A comparison of the estimated size of the hidden economy for 
the all-India along with some other Asian countries (reported in 
Appendix A)13 reveals that Thailand has by far, for the year 1994/95, 
the biggest shadow economy with 48.3% of the official GDP, followed 
by the Philippines with 38.4% and Sri Lanka with 35.3%. In the middle 
field is Taiwan with 17.4%, India with 20.3% and South Korea with 
22.4%. At the lower end is China with 10.2%, Japan with 10.6% and 
Singapore with 11.2% of the “official” GDP. 
In order to get a better understanding, we also calculate the 
growth rate of the underground economy for the pre-liberalization 
(1975/76-1991/92) and post-liberalization (1992/93-1995/ 96) for 
Indian states and report the results in Table 4. In the post-
liberalization era, the growth in the size of the underground is lower is 
most states except Haryana, Kerala, Rajasthan and West Bengal. The 
state of Rajasthan had the highest average growth rate in the post-
liberalization period whereas Andhra Pradesh had the lowest one. In 
the pre-liberalization era, Kerala experienced the lowest average 
growth rate where as that of Orissa was the highest. 
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4.2.2. Explaining the size of the hidden economy of Indian states 
In order to explain the size of the hidden economy, we ran the 
regression as given in Eq. (5). The result is reported in Table 5. 
Column 1 of Table 5 presents the regression results where we just 
used the political variables, namely the scheduled election, the 
coalition government, the match dummy, ideology of the government 
and the liberalization dummy. The lagged value of the hidden economy 
is negative and significant implying the evidence of convergence. Our 
results show that the growth in the size of the hidden economy is 
approximately 5% less in scheduled election years than in all other 
years. The coefficient associated with the Coalition Government is 
negative and statistically significant. The estimates reveal that the 
growth in the size of the hidden economy is around 3% less if the 
coalition is in power compared to a single-party government. The 
trend term is significant implying that the hidden economy is growing 
for the Indian states significantly. We also obtain the fact that the 
state where the left-wing government (Ideology) is in power the 
growth in the size of the hidden economy is less. The liberalization of 
the Indian economy that took place in 1991/92 also exerts a negative 
significant impact. 
In order to examine the robustness of the results reported in 
Column 1, in column 2, we introduced the following variable as a 
determinant of the growth in the Indian economy: the contribution of 
the primary sector (agriculture and allied services) in net state 
domestic product and proportion of rural population as control 
variables. Our results in terms of the political variable (the election 
dummy, coalition government, match dummy and ideology of the 
government) remain the same except the fact that both the match 
dummy and ideology becomes significant. Our result infers that state 
that has the same political party in power as in the Center is less 
active in terms of curbing the growth in the size of the hidden 
economy. We also note that an increase in the contribution of the 
primary sector significantly reduces the growth in the size of the 
hidden economy. 
Next, we try to focus on the role of print-media. In column 3 
Table 5 we have introduced both the growth in literacy rates and that 
in per capita total newspaper circulation. The reported results 
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document that both the variables yield the expected negative sign, 
although the effect is significant only in case of growth in per capita 
total newspaper circulation. This shows that state governments are 
more responsive to reduce the size of the hidden economy in those 
states where newspaper circulation is higher. In column (4) of Table 5, 
we have used growth in per capita newspaper circulation published in 
vernacular language instead of per capita total newspaper circulation. 
The coefficient associated with the variable is negative, although not 
significant. Our results almost remain the same with respect to other 
variables. 
We have used the scheduled election years only. However, if the 
regressions are re-estimated without differentiating between scheduled 
and mid-term elections, our reported results in Table 5 remains the 
same with the election variable enters with a negative and significant 
coefficient. Second, the effects of government fragmentation are 
robust and do not depend on how the election year dummy is coded. 
Third, the coefficient associated with the match dummy variabIe 
remains unaltered.14 However, the ideology variable loses its 
significance. 
Given these results, we ran another regression where we 
include the mid-term election as a separate variable along with the 
scheduled election to differentiate the impact of these two different 
types of elections. Here we obtain that both the scheduled and the 
mid-term election enters with negative significant coefficient.15 A test 
for the difference in estimated coefficients associated with these two 
variables reveals significant difference in the estimated coefficients at 
the 10 percent level. The results in terms of the other variable remain 
qualitatively the same.16 
In sum, we can infer that the growth in the size of the hidden 
economy is significantly lower in election years than all other years. A 
state where the coalition government is in power also experiences 
lower increase in the growth compared to single-party governments. 
Our results also provide some weak evidence that an increased growth 
in literacy rates and newspaper circulation results in a lower growth 
rate in the size of the hidden economy. We also document that 
increased competition in terms of liberalization of the Indian economy 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 80, No. 2 (2006): pg. 428-443. DOI. This article is © Elsevier and permission has 
been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Elsevier does not grant permission for this article 
to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Elsevier. 
15 
 
in 1991 also helps to reduce the growth in the size of the underground 
economy. 
5. Conclusion 
This paper tries to estimate the size of the hidden economy using 
state level data from India over the period 1974/75 to 1995/96. We 
have used a MIMIC model. The estimates from the MIMIC model 
demonstrate the varying size of the hidden economy in Indian states. 
On an average, the size has grown from 13.1% to 26.3%. 
We have also shown that an increased growth of per capita 
newspaper circulation helps to curb the growth in the size of the 
shadow economy activities in the economy. This focuses on the 
importance of free and independent regional presses as key factors for 
proper functioning of the democracy. Our result also demonstrates 
that the state governments are active during the election to provide a 
cleaner picture of the economy. Elections act as an incentive for 
politicians to perform. The growth in the size of the hidden economy is 
lower if the coalition government is in power. Our result also provides 
evidence in favor of liberalization of the Indian economy in order to 
reduce the growth in the size of the hidden economy. 
Notes 
◊ We would like to thank an anonymous referee for suggesting changes that 
greatly improved the quality of the paper. Thanks are also due to Prof. 
Mark Rosenzweig, The Editor of the journal. 
* Corresponding author. E-mail addresses: kausik@igidr.ac.in (K.Chaudhuri), 
friedrich.schneider@jku.at (F. Schneider). URL: 
http://www.econ.iku.at/Schneider/ (F. Schneider). 
1  Tel.: +43 70 2468 8210; fax: +43 70 2468 8209. 
2 See the Economic Journal, vol. 109, no. 456, June 1999 the feature 
“Controversy: on the hidden economy”. 
3 The literature about the “shadow”, “underground”, “informal”, “second”, 
“cash” or “parallel”, economy is increasing. Various topics, on how to 
measure it, its causes, and its effect on the official economy are 
analyzed. See for example, survey type publications by Frey and 
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Pommerehne (1984); Johnson et al. (1997, 1998); Lippert and Walker 
(1997); Loayza (1996); Pozo (1996); Schneider (l994a,b, 1997, 1998, 
2005) and Thomas (1992); and for an overall survey of the global 
evidence of its size in terms of value added Schneider and Enste 
(2000, 2002). 
4 This definition is used for example, by Feige (1989, 1994), Frey and 
Pommerehne (1984), and Lubell (1991) and Schneider (1994a, 2005). 
5 Kaldor (1956) tried to estimate the size of the hidden economy in India, by 
estimating the income that avoided the income tax. 
6 We have also tried using the growth in per capita real net state domestic 
product instead of growth in real net state domestic product. Our 
results in terms of the size of the hidden economy remain almost the 
same. The results are available on request. 
7 On an average, this amounts to around 87-88% of total state tax revenue. 
8 Besley and Burgess (2000) have also followed this kind of estimation 
strategy. 
9 http://www.eci.gov.in. 
10 Although we do not provide the estimates for each one of them, the results, 
however, are available for the authors on request. 
11 The BIMARU states are Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Rajasthan, and 
Uttar Pradesh. 
12 For the estimation of the hidden economy at the all-India level, please see 
Chattopadhyay et al. (2003). 
13 The calculationof the shadow economy for China is very difficult and the 
values may be questioned because only a part of China has so far 
been developed into a market economy. A great part of China still 
belongs to a planed economy and due to this mix of systems, the 
calculated figures may not be very reliable. 
14 The coefficient is 0.041 with a p-value of 0.000. 
15 The coefficient associated with the scheduled election is -0.048 and that of 
mid-term election is -0.028. The test for the difference in the 
estimated coefficients associated with these two variables yields a test 
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statistic of 2.79 distributed as χ2 with one degree of freedom. This is 
significant at the 10% level. 
16 The detailed results are available on request. 
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Appendix  
Table 1: MIMIC model results 
 
 
t-Statistics are reported in parenthesis. 
* Denotes significance at 10% level. 
** Denotes significance at 5% level. 
*** Denotes significance at 1% level. 
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Table 2: Diagnostic statistics of the estimated MIMIC model 
 
 
 
Table 3: Size of the hidden economy for states of India as a percent of measured net 
state domestic product. 
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Table 4: Growth in size of the hidden economy for states of India 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Regression results: growth in the size of the hidden economy 
 
Numbers in parentheses are the calculated Z-statistics.                                            
*Denotes significance at the 10% level.                                                                
**Denotes significance at the 5% level.                                                                             
***Denotes significance at the 1% level. 
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Figure 1: Average size (1974/75-1995/96) of the hidden economy of 14 Indian 
states 
 
 
 
 
Appendix A: Size of the hidden economy for some Asian countries (percent of 
official GDP in 1994/95) 
 
 
